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30 July 1980

West Europe Report

(FOUO 33/80)



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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

FRANCE

MISSILE PROPULSION DEVELOPMENTS FORECAST TO 1985

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 7 Jun 80 p 18

[Article by Pierre Langereux: "The SEP's Hopes Looking Toward 1985"]

[Text] Big civilian and military propulsion programs will continue to provide the SEP [European Propellant Company] with most of its turnover until 1985, Pierre Soufflet, SEP's president, said at the CRPAE [expansion unknown] dinner on 3 June.

Development of the new MSBS-M4 ballistic missile is approaching completion with the initial firing scheduled for October 1980. The SEP is now basing its hopes on: studies of future M40 and SX (mobile missile) ballistic missiles; a feasibility study for the 60-ton cryogenic engine for Ariane 5 (135,000,000 francs between 1980 and 1983); development of apogee explosive engines for the Meteostat (Magus 1), Marecs A (Magus 1S), ECS [Command and Service Squadron] and Telecom (Magus 2), direction of which was taken over by the CNES [National Center for Space Studies] early in 1980; and sales of meteorologic and observation satellite image receiving stations, the export market for which is estimated at 1,000,000 francs between now and 1985 (and the same amount for support stations). The SEP, which has already been retained for the CNES "spot" station and a Landsat D station in Brazil, hopes to get about 20 to 25 percent of this market. The SEP has also been retained by the CNES for the propulsion system (40,000,000 francs) and deployment mechanism of the "spot" satellite's solar panels (15,000,000 francs).

The SEP president also believes that a "decision of principle" was taken in favor of the French military observation "Sambo" satellite, but with no definite launching date. The SEP is also conducting studies of future laser guidance of anti-tank missiles, and it is going to respond to a call for French bids on a 150-mile-range unguided anti-tank missile for street combat.

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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

FRANCE

NEW ALBION PLATEAU S3 MISSILE UNIT NOW OPERATIONAL

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 31 May 80 pp 52-54

[Article by Jean de Galard]

[Text] On Friday 23 May 1980, on the Albion Plateau, where the First Strategic Missile Group (GMS) has been in place since 1968, Defense Minister Yvon Bourges attended the final operations before putting into service on 1 June 1980 the first of two firing units consisting of nine second-generation SSBS-S3 missiles. Also attending the preliminary activities were officers of the firms and services that were the architects of the S3 program's success at the industrial and technical level: Jacques Mitterand, Aerospace Chairman, and Mr. Chevalier, who is military operations director for the Atomic Energy Commission.

General Engineer Collet-Billon, technical director for missiles, and those on the operational level who today, by virtue of their position, are in charge of "making available to the French government at all times and to the highest degree the surface-to-surface deterrent force," Air Force Gen Guy Fleury, Air Force chief of staff, Air Force Maj Gen Jean Sauinier, commanding the Strategic Air Forces, Air Force Maj Gen Jean Maffre, commanding the First GMS, and many of the area's prominent civilians were also present.

The history of the First GMS, which is confused today with that of the Strategic surface-to-surface Force, is summed up in a few dates: it was created in 1967; in 1968 it took up its position on the Albion Plateau; it is made up of two firing units, each consisting of nine S2 missiles, which conducted their first operational alert on 2 August 1971 and 23 April 1972 respectively.

In 1972 a defense council conceived the idea of an SSBS-S3A with a megaton thermonuclear charge, to replace the S2 missile after 1980.

In 1975 the program was decided upon and launched. Its objective was to put the first S3 firing unit into operational service on 1 June 1980. Work on the conversion began in April 1978 and involved putting one of the two S2 units out of service, the other of course remaining 100 percent operational. On 1 June 1980, five years after the decision had been made and the project launched, the deadlines were met and the firing unit had remained available to go into operation at any moment.

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That availability could not have been achieved except at the price of extremely strict management of the work (control over deadlines and costs), and the defense minister hastened to emphasize that strictness--which made it possible to follow exactly a schedule set five years in advance--as well as to express publicly the government's recognition of all the architects of that success.

Work is to begin in the next few weeks on replacing the second firing unit's S2 missiles with S3s identical to those now operational in the first firing unit. This second SSBS-S3 unit is scheduled to go into service in late 1982.

The defense minister intended to demonstrate by his presence last week on the Albion Plateau--as 20 days earlier he had been eager to preside over the ceremony in Brest marking the departure of the Fifth Submarine of the Strategic Deterrent Force on its first operational campaign (AIR ET COSMOS, No 812)--that he was placing equal value and importance on two of the three components of the French Strategic Deterrence Force: the Strategic Oceanic Force (FOST), each of whose five SNLEs [Missile Launching Nuclear Submarines] today carries 16 M20 megaton thermonuclear charged missiles, and the SSBSes of the First GMS, whose S3 version is equivalent to the M20. By so doing, the minister had an opportunity to stress the remarkable continuity of French deterrence policy, "whose solid foundation has not been challenged by any political trend."

The presence of 18 strategic missiles on the Albion Plateau brings to reality the idea of the national territory as a sanctuary. That the stationary site contains stationary targets certainly does not mean that one day it can be "totally silenced, even if there should be a massive attack. Retaliatory capability is necessary in any case, and our SNLEs thoroughly meet that condition," the minister concluded, "but since no one can guarantee that the SNLE will be invulnerable forever, it seemed to us wise to keep several components, the idea being either mobile surface-to-surface missiles or stationary, but movable missiles."

Installation on the Albion Plateau of a third firing unit, as initially envisaged, has now been abandoned insofar as the S2 missile is involved. Its availability was excellent for nine years--about 95 to 97 percent. The S3 missile's technologic characteristics guarantee that its operational availability will be maintained at an equally high level for seven years. Once a year the Air Force successfully fired, from the Landes Testing Center, a randomly-chosen missile; on the Albion Plateau a similar S3 firing program will enable verification of the new system's reliability.

The S2 and S3 are both missiles having two explosive stages, the first of which (16 tons) is the same in both versions. The S3 is lower in height than the S2.


From an operational point of view the advantages of the S3 over the S2 are as follows: more power charge (one thermonuclear megaton, as opposed to 150 kilotons for the S2); better penetration capability (greater speed, use of lures, more durable on-board equipment); greater military protection; potential for integral lateral support (suitability for a central firing station

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normally controlling nine missiles to run all 18 silos); transmission of information to the FAS [Strategic Air Force] command by means of a polychromatic television network which has been dubbed "Scorpion."

From a technical point of view the S3's improvements are in the area of simplification and flexibility, thanks to the adaptation of digital technology (small microprocessors, a single type of computer instead of three), the elimination of all ventilation of the equipment compartment, the separation of the two "firing" and "maintenance" systems. The S3's advantages also lie in the areas of improved preventive maintenance, longer intervals between maintenance, use of mobile checking bodies that will make it possible to proceed with surface checks without cutting off operation of the missile, in curative maintenance, automatic confining of damage, computerized banks equipped with a single computer, under SIMAT [Constant Equipment Data].


Since last March the First GMS has been qualified as Atom. It is recognized as capable of firing S3 missiles.



This photo of the experimental launching site gives an idea of the imposing dimensions of the VTE [erector launcher] that conveys the SSBS' two stages to each silo, after they have been assembled.

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The three photos above and the three shown on the following page show the various phases of the sequence introducing the upper part of the missile (equipment compartment and thermonuclear charge) into the silo, inside which it is affixed to the top part of the middle's second stage.

Key:

1. The upper part rests on the VTPH (Upper Part Launcher) that conveys it from the storage area. 2 and 3. The gantry lifts the upper part and moves it laterally, to convey it to a vertical position over the launching silo; the head is inside a shell; the bottom is left on the VTPH.

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
4

Key:

4. Minister Yvon Bourges walks past the silo as the upper part slowly disappears within it. 5. The descent continues, under the direction of the procedures supervisor (in nuclear affairs, anything unwritten is forbidden), the nuclear security officer and the site chief. One important security and protection provision remains in place, as the main gate will not be closed again. A VLEP (Polyvalent Extinguishment Vehicle with a flow of 4,000 liters per minute and four crew members) provides fire protection; it may be seen in the following photo. 6. The upper part is in the silo.

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On entering the launching area one perceives in the background the upper part of the missile and the protection vehicles; in the foreground, on parade because of the imminent arrival of the minister, rifleman-commandos and their dogs.

The upper part has descended into the silo and has been affixed to the top part of the missile's second stage; the silo is about to be covered again. The two vehicles (acquisition and firing) of a Crotale unit ready to go into action may be distinguished in the right background. (Photography by Michel Isaac)

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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

FRANCE

BRIEFS

NUCLEAR SUB BASE--Although the French government is clinging to the hypothesis that a second missile-launching nuclear submarine base, separate from the present Long Island base should be installed in Brest Harbor, the choice of the experts, according to general staff studies, would lean toward Chevre Point in Douarnenez Bay. The proximity of land-based logistic support installation on the Crozon Peninsula would make possible joint use of the already-existing means of serving the Long Island base, which cannot receive both units at the same time. Two or three additional cells would be developed in Douarnenez Bay. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 23 Jun 80 p 19] 8946

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COUNTRY SECTION

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

GENSCHER OUTLINES FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE COMING DECADE

Bonn EUROPA ARCHIV in German 25 Jun 80 pp 371-386

[Lecture by FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher at the celebration of the 25th anniversary of the founding of the German Society of Foreign Policy on 20 May 1980 in Bonn: "German Foreign Policy for the Eighties"]

[Text] Mr President, Ladies and Gentlemen,

At this festive session in honor of the 25th anniversary of the German Society for Foreign Policy I want to express to you the Federal Government's felicitations. At the same time I want to thank you for acting as an independent and nonpartisan Body, offering expert advice and constructive criticism, for our common cause over the past 25 years--German foreign policy in representation of German interests among the international community.

It is to your credit, Mr President that this was not done within a small circle of initiated individuals but rather with the goal of establishing a broad national consensus on the basic issues of West German foreign policy--a task which in the current international situation today is more necessary than ever before.

The Eighties--A New Period in German Foreign Policy

An anniversary such as this one calls for a look back in order to focus clearly on the current situation and the present challenges by means of a comparison:

A quarter of a century ago, in 1955, the FRG regained its sovereignty; it was admitted into the North Atlantic Defense Alliance. Soon thereafter it was also one of the founding members of the European Community. This was the first period in German policy, the period of construction: construction of a free democratic system of government, a period of economic reconstruction and the integration of the FRG into the community of Western democracies.

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The second period of German policy began at the end of the sixties: the period of treaties with the East, the normalization of relations between the FRG and its Eastern neighbors, the establishment of relations with the GDR, the stabilization of Berlin's situation, the improvement of contacts between people in the West and the East and between Germans on both sides of the border, the intensification of efforts to achieve security and cooperation in Europe, as well as arms control and disarmament.

Today, at the beginning of the eighties, we face the start of a new period in international policy and thus also in our own West German foreign policy.

The novel aspect becomes clear as we visualize the situation that prevailed at the end of the sixties: at that time West Germany existed in an international system which was characterized practically only by the goals and needs of the Western democracies. It included Europe's former colonies. They, to be sure, had become politically independent. But that had not introduced any essential changes in economic relations with them. They adjusted to the free-trade international economic system, they continued to deliver oil and raw materials, and they were wide open as markets for the sale of the West's industrial commodities.

The East Bloc and China were outside that world. They, so to speak, formed a Second World--autarchic, separated from the West by "iron curtains." Western policy toward this second, communist world essentially boiled down to a policy of security and containment.

There are three developments which during the seventies fundamentally altered this bipartite world:

The first development was the rise of the Soviet Union from a regional big power to a global superpower, which pulled abreast with the United States in intercontinental nuclear armaments and which acquired the capability for worldwide power assertion through the buildup of its air transport capacities and its fleet.

The second development was the open outbreak of opposition between the PRC and the Soviet Union. China's emergence from isolation and the establishment of relationships with the West were connected with that.

The third development, finally, was the entry of the countries of the Third World into international politics. They ceased to be passive participants in the existing international political and international economic system. Instead, they became actors in world politics who wanted to push their own ideas, their own interests, their own claims and who have power of their own--as a group and, some of them, also individually.

Behind these three developments there is finally one and the same force: the growing-together of nations--powered by modern technology and modern communications facilities--into one world of global interdependence.

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Today, countries can attain their goals of peace and economic prosperity only through globe-girdling cooperation.

In relations between industrial and developing countries, the earlier one-sided dependence has yielded to mutual dependence. And this is exactly the way East and West also find themselves forced to develop dialogue and cooperation above and beyond all conflicts in order to preserve peace and to solve the problems of today's world which concerns everybody.

Forms and instruments of worldwide conflict control and conflict resolution are becoming increasingly necessary and the utilization of the discoveries of peace and conflict research in practical politics is becoming ever more urgent. The talks which were resumed in Belgrade and Vienna--considering the meetings possible there--show the desire of not leaving the crisis to itself but rather bringing it under control.

A Worldwide System of Cooperation Based on Equality

If mutually dependent countries are not together to drift into chaos and war, they must get together within a setup of worldwide cooperation. But that also confronts us with the decisive challenge of our epoch: to create a worldwide system which will make this global cooperation possible and which will organize it in a reliable manner.

In the past, order among countries mostly meant either predominance or subordination. "Pax Romana"--the predominance of a single imperial power--and the "European Concert"--joint rule by a few leading powers--these were the systems we find in history.

We all know that, in our complex world of today, with more than 150 countries, these systems will no longer do. A policy of predominance and the use of military force can as a rule create only one thing in such a world: chaos, economic decline, and the misery of refugees.

International order today can be attained only through voluntary integration, through cooperation on the basis of equal rights, of mutual advantage, and fair balance of interests. Here are the elements of such a system: pluralism and noninterference in internal affairs, partnership cooperation and joint responsibility for the solution of global problems, conflict settlement and interest adjustment during a constant negotiation process.

The important thing now is to build up such a worldwide system of partnerships. The goal is clear. But the road leading there is difficult and rather confused and it is also surrounded by dangers. Times of transition to a new order are times of instability.

In view of these new, worldwide challenges, German foreign policy also faces new tasks. It necessarily receives an additional worldwide dimension.

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We must, politically and economically, make our contribution to the buildup of a worldwide system of partnership cooperation based on equality.

Foundation: European Community and North Atlantic Alliance

The readiness to assume responsibility, as far as the FRG is concerned, does not signify a temptation to go it alone as a nation. The foundation of German foreign policy is our being embedded in the European Community and the North Atlantic Alliance. Only within these two communities can we secure the survival and growth of our country in peace, freedom, and economic-social stability. The first priority of our policy must therefore be to keep them strong and to develop them further.

Our membership in the European Community and the Alliance as well as our advocacy of peace, equal rights among countries, partnership-based international cooperation, and the implementation of human rights are the basic common features of our policy. They make this policy calculable for everybody.

European Community and North Atlantic Alliance here are not just corporations. Instead, they are first of all value-oriented communities.

The European Community from the very beginning considered itself to be the advocate of a grand historical idea: the European idea of freedom and of the dignity of man. It is the belief in this idea which unites Europe. And we must reawaken the emotional strength of this belief if we want to overcome the present difficult problems of the Community. The current international situation more than ever before calls for an action-ready and strong community. And, conversely: Europe can secure its future in freedom only if it consistently continues on the road of integration.

The United States is not the adversary but rather the advocate of European unity. The United States knows that a Europe, speaking with one voice, is a better partner for the United States than a disunited Europe. The strong backbone of European cooperation and unification here is the close relationship between the FRG and France.

Just like the European Community, so the North Atlantic Alliance is a value-based community which is founded on the equality of the basic conviction as to the dignity and the rights of man. This fundamentally distinguishes this alliance from the exchangeable military alliances of the traditional style. This is what gives it its vitality and its strength to overcome internal problems and to face external challenges. The awareness of being a community of freedom with a common destiny renders any attempt hopeless which is aimed at splitting Europeans and Americans away from each other.

The Alliance will be able to accomplish its mission of continuing to secure peace in the future likewise only if all of its partners make their contributions to common security, if the Europeans do not confuse the Alliance

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with an American security guard service for Europe. Only the self-assertion determination of the democracies in Europe and North America, only their determination to have a strong defense can preserve the Alliance's freedom of action.

East-West Detente on the Basis of Equal Rights and Balance

The Federal Government will continue its detente policy on the firm foundation of the Alliance and the Community of Nine; this is the policy which it established together with its Western partners for more than two decades.

If we come up with a realistic situation estimate as to the meaning and possibilities of the detente policy, then one cannot say that it failed even after Afghanistan, nor can one say that it will be superfluous in the future.

It is important for us to realize what detente policy can do and what it cannot do. It does not promise to eliminate the fundamental contradictions in global concepts between West and East. Detente policy does not promise us a hale and healthy world. It does not even promise us straight-line progress without any setbacks. It is no substitute for the determination to put up our own defense--instead, it presupposes such a determination.

Detente policy must first of all be characterized by the consensus to the effect that threats and use of force must be ruled out as means for resolving conflicts and that causes of tension must be eliminated through common efforts or that they must at least be defused to such a point that they will not lead to dangerous conflicts.

Detente policy presupposes the participation of both international powers. In view of the power-politics and ideological concept of one side, it calls for a combination of incentives and warnings. It must consider the security interests of the other side in each case and it must resist the temptation to shift the balance in its own favor and at the expense of the other side. Balance is a prerequisite for any realistic detente policy which we cannot do without.

The Soviet Union's essential motive in arriving at an arrangement with the United States via detente was the Soviet endeavor to be recognized as a world power. The Soviet Union achieved basic recognition from the United States in 1972.

Accordingly, the Soviet Union has also acquired the military means which enable it to act as a world power in the international arena. Its military capacity has been so boosted since the end of the sixties that it is able today to face the United States worldwide on a basis of equality.

The United States however, for a series of reasons, including also the Vietnam War and Watergate, cut back on its armament efforts, its

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possibilities of implementing American and Western interests in the world if necessary by military means because the Congress and public opinion, following the experiences in Vietnam, tied the hands of the president and his administration. That caused a misunderstanding to arise, to the effect that the United States did not seriously oppose the one-sided gain of position by the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union--which had never construed detente as something which in its language would be called "the freezing of objective historical development processes," as a "safe-conduct for decayed regimes" (Soviet government declaration of 2 May 1976)--feels encouraged to exploit unrest and instability in the Third World for its own ends. Afghanistan made the West aware of where this Soviet double standard--respecting the detente principles in European stability but violating them under the labile conditions in other parts of the world--can lead.

In America, the response was an alarmed awakening. The administration, supported by Congress and the public, declared itself determined to accept these challenges and to make the necessary efforts in order to counter any further shifts in the worldwide balance.

The destiny of mankind during the eighties will essentially depend on whether it will be possible, not only in Europe, but also worldwide to switch from confrontation to interest adjustment and cooperation. The Americans agree with us that the crisis cannot be resolved by shifting the East-West conflict to the Third World.

Just as important as the guarantee of military balance is the stabilization of labile regions through a readiness toward economic and political cooperation with those countries in the particular regions of the Third World who want to make sure that their independence will be preserved.

The fundamental principle--to the effect that detente can work only if there is a renunciation of the attainment of one-sided advantages--applies also to Afghanistan and in that case it also applies to both sides. The Americans and European Community, which submitted a solution proposal on 19 February 1980, are in favor of that.

Relationships between the FRG and the Soviet Union assume special importance for detente policy in Europe.

Without the treaty policy of the FRG, detente would not have been possible in Europe. There would have been no four-power agreement, nor would we have had the final acts of Helsinki, nor would there have been any Vienna MBFR negotiations. If the foundation, which was created in relations between the FRG and its Eastern neighbors, were to be shaken, then the detente process in Europe would be interrupted.

The firm anchoring of German policy in the Western economic and alliance system here is the basis for doing business. It is not only in our

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interest. The development of German-Soviet relationships can make its contribution to European stability only through the tie-in with the policy of detente between the superpowers.

The significance of Eastern policy regarding the German issue resides in the possibility of preserving the feeling of belonging together, the desire to belong together within the German nation through the maintenance and strengthening of contacts between people--a desire which is a real psychological and historically effective force. During the eighties the important thing will be to continue this development steadily.

It is important to supplement the transportation agreements, which were concluded in 1978 and 1980 between the two German states and which especially served for the purpose of securing Berlin, through agreements in the fields of culture, science, and legal aid and to achieve progress in the humanitarian sphere, especially by making travel easier. We are ready to work toward new and long-term agreements which during the eighties and nineties will guarantee the needs of our nation and the needs of Berlin likewise.

Arms Control Policy--the Effort To Achieve Balance on the Lowest Possible Level

The military aspects of detente were moved to the focus of East-West discussion in recent years. It is obvious that the eighties will bring a decision on disarmament or arms race. Our successful endeavor to include security-policy aspects in the final document of Helsinki by stipulating confidence-building measures, proved to have been correct.

Our goal is clear: first of all, we want security on the basis of equality; second, we want balance on the lowest possible level of armament.

The possibility of turning the eighties into a decade of disarmament has not yet slipped away from us even though the developments of recent months certainly did not improve the prospects for that. All efforts to achieve disarmament will be promising only if nobody tries to obtain one-sided advantages but if instead the interests of the particular other side are included in one's own considerations.

That must apply to the continuation of the CSCE process, the establishment and activities of a European disarmament conference, the MBFR negotiations, and the talks on medium-range weapons.

The SALT negotiating process established the principle of balance for intercontinental strategic weapons. The goal for the eighties must be to establish this principle also for the other sectors.

The twin decision of the Western defense alliance on the issue of medium-range weapons expresses the double goal in a classical manner:

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1. Balance means not accepting superiority of the other side;
2. Balance on the lowest possible level of armaments.

At the threshold of the eighties, the topic of medium-range weapons becomes the key question as to whether it will be possible to create a balance equally downward, that is to say, through disarmament, or whether we will be forced to work out a balance upward, that is to say, toward the arms race, or whether Western Europe--by accepting the growing superiority of the Eastern side--will go the way of unhitching from the United States in security-policy terms.

The West's determination to carry out the Brussels decision without restrictions--and that also means to negotiate without any prior conditions--demonstrates our determination to do everything in our power to secure the balance and to prevent a new arms race. Every doubt nurtured in the West as to our determination to restore the balance therefore does not signify any easing of disarmament efforts but rather constitutes a burden because it nurtures hope in the East that a situation of accepted Eastern superiority might come about.

Development of Confidence

If it is true that a responsible security policy includes the ability to see also the interests, worries, and hopes of the particular other side, then it becomes clear that the development of confidence assumes an essential role. Confidence-forming measures therefore will have to be an essential component of West-East endeavors. Here we are only at the beginning of the development of existing possibilities.

A quantitative and qualitative extension of confidence-forming measures must be turned into a dynamic element of European arms control policy.

Quantitatively this means that the regional sphere of application of the confidence-building measures to be newly developed must, in keeping with the French proposal for a European disarmament conference, extend to all of Europe.

In qualitative terms this means that we must have maximum possible transparency of all decisions and facts concerning security. For example, arms exports all over the world must no longer be secret; they also concern European security. Arms policy decisions, in connection with which the development of new weapons systems is treated as a secret matter, constitute cause of distrust on the other side; taken up openly, they at any rate mean more calculability and that is a prerequisite for building confidence.

One can easily see that this approach to confidence-building demands more of the East than of the West because the latter already at this time offers a high degree of publicity as a consequence of our open society. But this

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is precisely why the East should realize that the international security discussion also involves the establishment of balance in terms of calculability.

The discussion on TNF modernization, which took place in the West especially in 1979, is an example of the measure of calculability and predictability which the Western states offered to the East by virtue of their open structure.

This element of security could be multiplied through corresponding behavior on the other side. We must ask the question what course arms control policy regarding medium-range weapons could have taken if the rapid introduction of the SS-20 by the East had been prepared in an equally transparent manner as the West's TNF followup effort. The positive effect could have been made even stronger if the SS-20 decision had been connected with an Eastern offer to negotiate on medium-range weapons.

Continuation of CSCE Process

In the past, Europe has been a theater of horrible wars and it was often also the starting point of wars that spread to other parts of the world.

Today it must be our goal to contribute to the peaceful settlement of conflicts all over the world--and that applies to the Afghanistan crisis, to the Iran crisis, to the Near East, to southern Africa, and to other regions. We must in our environment create models of military security which will not only give us stability here but which will also make that stability effective in other parts of the world.

The important thing is, especially in difficult times, to work toward the implementation of the goals of the final acts of Helsinki and to recognize the as yet unused perspectives--specifically, in all three baskets.

The CSCE process is a long-term thing. We must stick to it even though changes in the climate might come about in relations between East and West. In such situations, its stabilizing function must do its job even though, quite by nature, the overall situation may have an advantageous or disadvantageous effect on the particular followup conferences.

It is especially in difficult times that we should avail ourselves of the opportunity to hold such conferences on a political level. The existing consultations should be used in order to work out specific points for Madrid in some baskets--points which will make it possible to make progress during the conference scheduled to start in November 1980.

In basket II this applies, for example, to cooperation in the field of energy and to the improvement of economic-policy information; in basket III this applies to the continual development of humanitarian regulations, such as reuniting families and travel possibilities. Compliance with the

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provisions on freedom of information is also of special significance; these provisions are important in international cooperation also beyond the CSCE area in the development of modern information media.

North-South Cooperation in Equal Partnership

Detente on the basis of equal rights and balance is one of the pillars in building up a worldwide system in which countries secure their future amid peace and prosperity through common responsibility. Partnership cooperation between industrial and developing countries on the other hand is the second pillar.

Independence and Self-Determination of the Third World

The decisive forces in the Third World today are the will to achieve independence and self-determination, the desire for the implementation of their own identity, the striving for economic development. Only a Third World policy, which is allied with these forces, can be successful in the long run and lead to fruitful cooperation.

The movement of the nonaligned countries is the expression of the Third World's desire for independence. The nonaligned movement currently is in a phase of transition from its anticolonial founding phase to the phase of assertion and development of independence and self-reliance just achieved.

The coming years will also be characterized by the dispute which emerged out into the open in Havana during the summit meeting of nonaligned countries, a dispute which involved the following alternatives: political independence or siding with the Soviet Union which the representatives of that course consider the "natural ally" of the nonaligned countries.

Historical development, which is clearly aimed at the implementation of self-determination, tells us that the way of independence will prevail over the way of leaning [toward the Soviet Union]. The vast majority in Havana came out against tilting toward the Soviet Union.

But the Western democracies should realize clearly that this vote was directed not only against leaning toward the Soviet Union but against any kind of leaning, even against leaning toward the West. The policy of true nonalignment counters any policy of predominance and justification for spheres of influence.

Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was condemned by an overwhelming majority of the Third World. The Third World feels that this intervention is directed against it and that it is not primarily an East-West problem. But, in agreement with the West, it demands the solution of the Afghanistan crisis through the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

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The Third World's reaction to Afghanistan shows that the policy of spheres of influence increasingly creates a conflict between the Soviet Union and the countries of the Third World. If the West convincingly advocates self-determination and equal rights for the countries of the Third World, then it can be a fair partner for the Third World. It would lose that opportunity only if it were to copy the Soviet policy of spheres of influence and if it thus wanted to shift the East-West conflict to the Third World.

It would also lose its opportunity if it denied the legitimate claims of the Third World and that means, for example, if it were to deny the self-determination rights of the Palestinian people within the framework of a comprehensive and just peace solution or if it were to oppose the elimination of colonialism and racism in Namibia and South Africa.

The West would finally violate the principles of fair partnership with countries of the Third World also where it would allow itself to be misused as protector of outdated structures. Developments in Central America will be a test case as to whether the West knows how to go along with this insight.

The concept for a Western-Third World policy can only be this: support for the independence and self-determination of the Third World. Only this kind of concept has a future and it alone can preserve peace.

This is why mistrust must be reduced in the West and in the Third World with respect to this. The mistrust of the nonaligned countries springs from the experiences during colonial times; but they fail to realize that the desire for partnership today is present everywhere in the West. The West's distrust has its roots in the close cooperation of nonaligned and communist countries during the anticolonial phase of the nonaligned movement; but here one overlooks the fact that this cooperation very often was neither sought nor wanted by the peoples of the Third World but that instead it was forced upon them by the shortsightedness and rejection of progress on the part of Western countries.

A long-term Western policy signifies foregoing the attempt to export our own political, social, and economic system concept. On the contrary, it means respecting and approving the independent way of the Third World. In addition to security and the development of independence from foreign countries, the preservation of identity or--above all in Africa--the search for identity is today the decisive force in the Third World.

Peaceful Conflict Resolution and Support of Regional Alliances

Strengthening the independence of the Third World also means making a contribution to the settlement of conflicts in the Third World by peaceful means and through negotiations. The example of Zimbabwe in recent months proved impressively that conflicts indeed can be resolved peacefully and

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that they can be solved without chaos and destruction only in this manner. The Western concept of peaceful conflict resolution has gained credibility and confidence through the success in Zimbabwe not only in Africa but also in the Third World.

Strengthening the independence of the Third World means, thirdly, to support the trend toward regional alliances in the Third World. These alliances can make an essential contribution to the promotion of independence, political stability, and economic growth of their member states.

The policy of the European community here faces a special task because, as an example of the successful gathering of countries with equal rights, it is in many cases a model for the third world.

Interregional cooperation between the EC and the groupings in the Third World can provide important impetus for these alliances especially during their initial phases. We Germans therefore have made ourselves the advocates in the EC for the buildup of this kind of interregional cooperation.

The EC/ASEAN cooperation agreement was initiated by us. It is an example of Europe's readiness to follow through on its possibilities and assume its responsibility. The same applies to the dialogue begun last month with the countries of the Andean Pact. And it is likewise important to activate and politically upgrade the European-Arab dialogue. The dialogue with the Gulf states, which is still in the experimental stage, must also be pursued energetically.

In Africa, the first economic summit conference in Lagos clearly revealed the tendency toward regional alliances. Here again it is important for the EC to use the possibilities for promoting such alliances. We are doing this already in the Lome Convention which provides considerable aid for the support of regional projects.

Strengthening the independence of the Third World last but not least--and this must be clearly stressed once again--signifies the recognition and promotion of the stabilizing role of the nonaligned movement.

I want to make sure that I expressly welcome at this point the fact that Yugoslavia, also after the death of President Tito will continue to play a leading role in the nonaligned movement. We owe it to President Tito that the nonaligned movement, from the day of its founding, lacked any anti-European character due to the cooperation of Yugoslavia, a European country.

Development Aid--Policy for Securing also Our Own Vital Interests

A future worldwide system of peace and equal cooperation presupposes that we understand the development of the countries of the Third World as a

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task that is also of concern to us. Peace and prosperity in our environment also depend on whether it will be possible to put an end to hunger in the Third World and to achieve growth coupled with stability. The report of the Brandt Commission pointed that up impressively. Development aid is a humanitarian duty. But it is no less an act designed to protect our own vital interests likewise.

Between 1970 and 1978, the developing countries--apart from the oil exporting countries which have a capital balance surplus--attained a growth rate of 5.8 percent per year, in other words, a growth which is only a little bit behind the 6-percent goal for the second development decade.

But those 5.8 percent are an average. That figure conceals a gap in the Third World.

Some of the developing countries--the oil-exporting countries and those countries which are advanced in the industrialization process--attained very high growth rates. But it was especially the poorer developing countries which on the other hand fell far behind; here, growth in some cases was not even enough to keep up with the population increase. But even in fast-growing developing countries, large population segments were practically excluded from development. The number of poor people and starving people here likewise grew in many countries.

During the coming third development decade it will thus be important to achieve two things:

It must be possible at last to speed up development also in the poor developing countries and to achieve satisfactory growth rates;

And it must be possible to involve all population strata in the development process and thus put an end to absolute poverty and naked misery.

In the year 2000, the developing countries, including China, will be inhabited by 4.6 billion people, in other words, more than we have all over the world today. This calls for enormous efforts in order to prevent a deterioration in the situation of the people of the Third World. That situation can be improved only through the united effort of all countries: the industrial countries in the West and East as well as the developing countries themselves.

Priorities for Coming Global North-South Negotiations

The 11th Special General Assembly of the United Nations in August of this year in New York will fire the starting gun for the commencement of new global negotiations between North and South. It is important to seize this opportunity in order to mobilize the forces of all countries within a coordinated policy toward the great goal of putting an end to hunger and misery.

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The priorities must include the following:

For the poor developing countries, it is particularly important to increase public development aid. We hope that the communist industrial countries will at last assume a share in keeping with their potential when it comes to providing this kind of aid.

Oil price rises created severe balance of payments difficulties also for the middle-income oil-exporting developing countries. The important thing will be to make adequate means available for deficit-financing also to them, through international institutions, such as, above all, the IMF, and through private banks.

Just as in the case of public aid for the poorer developing countries, the opening of markets of the industrial countries is of central significance for the advanced developing countries.

In 1979, industrial commodity exports of developing countries not belonging to OPEC revealed almost the same value as raw material exports, apart from oil. Here is what that means: the monopoly of the industrial countries in the field of industrial commodity exports is nearing an end. Regardless of whether we approve or disapprove that development, this is what makes or breaks cooperation between North and South. Closing our markets to the industrial commodity exports of the Third World and denying the change of the traditional trade structure, within which the developing countries supplied raw materials while the industrial countries delivered finished goods, would mean nothing more or less than denying the Third World its growth.

Keeping the markets open undoubtedly confronts the industrial countries with big problems especially in the current difficult international situation. But we must cope with these problems and with the structural change.

The coming global North-South negotiations should for the first time include the energy issue, in other words, the key issue for the industrial countries and the developing countries. The transition from the age of oil to the age of other energies will demand maximum domestic effort by all countries in terms of energy savings and in investments for coal, nuclear energy, and other forms of energy. The transition however can be handled here without an abrupt break only if the oil-producing and oil-consuming countries work together on a basis of joint responsibility.

The oil-producing countries want to develop their economy for the time after oil. Among other things, they need technology transfer, safe open markets for their future industrial goods exports, secure and attractive investment policies for their foreign exchange surpluses. The oil-consuming countries on the other hand must have a reliable supply of oil and must be protected against abrupt price rises. The oil-importing

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developing countries moreover need aid for the development of their own energy resources.

These interests can be satisfied only through cooperation and it should be possible in an energy dialogue to organize the balancing of interests and fruitful cooperation.

Let me take up one last point: the issue of development strategy.

There is not just one single strategy that applies to every country; there is only a multiplicity of strategies which in each case must be selected on the basis of the special resources and facts in each developing country. But there is one thing that applies to every strategy: it must be so designed that it will set in motion a broad development process which will include the masses of the poor. We must avoid a situation where the economy and society in the developing countries will be divided into two sectors: a modern sector which takes care of growth and a traditional sector which stagnates and in which everything remains the same for the people, that is to say, hunger and misery. Only a development process which involves the masses of the poor can in the long run facilitate development coupled with stability.

A central component of such a balanced development strategy will in most countries have to consist of the priority promotion of agriculture: promotion of a modern agriculture which however will achieve high productivity increases not through machinery but through labor-intensive methods. Only through this kind of resolute promotion of agriculture will it be possible at the same time to solve the threatening food problems in many developing countries.

Active Cooperation in the United Nations

The development of the United Nations will be of essential significance to the development of the international situation during the eighties.

In the Western world, enthusiasm for the United Nations, such as it existed during its first decade, has yielded meanwhile to resignation, distrust, and disparagement. A sober approach shows us quickly that the positive basic attitude in the beginning constituted not only laurels gained in advance but also represented the result of Western domination in the United Nations. Soviet veto records were viewed as Western successes and in the process everybody completely overlooked the fact that new majority conditions were shaping up.

Disparaging the United Nations however means overlooking the fact that the United Nations is not the cause of world problems. It is true however that the problems of the world are reflected in the United Nations.

In view of the plurality of the international community of countries, the formation of a kind of worldwide opinion springs from the United Nations

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and that worldwide opinion, due to the rising significance of the non-aligned, is becoming an ever stronger political factor. We can recognize today that political decisions in the various countries of the world--although to a differing degree--take into consideration worldwide public opinion such as it is expressed in the United Nations.

Resignation toward or disparagement of the United Nations signifies renunciation of cooperation in the formation of that worldwide opinion. It is especially countries such as the FRG which should do everything they can in order to introduce their views into this process of worldwide opinion formation.

Positive effects deriving from the activities of the United Nations--for example, the peace-preserving missions--should not be underestimated even though they may be limited.

The real problem of the United Nations is the cumbersome nature of its structures which forces the conduct of mammoth conferences on highly complicated topic areas. Nevertheless, opinions have also moved closer together during such conferences--of course rather late in many cases. For example, we must ask whether it might have been possible, 10 or 15 years ago, to achieve considerable and constructive effects with the positions adopted today by the industrial countries regarding the North-South problem complex.

Some misdevelopments in the opinion formation of the Third World on issues of international economy are also the consequences of the earlier underdevelopment of problem awareness in the industrial countries, which led to unsuitable solution proposals, whereas realistic proposals would certainly have had a chance of constructively influencing third world opinion formation.

What applies to the United Nations applies to all associations and bodies: they cannot be any better than their members allow them to be. In spite of its incompleteness, the United Nations long ago became indispensable. We in West Germany therefore should work toward its activation also in the future.

Basic Ideas of German Foreign Policy at the Threshold of the Eighties

At the threshold of the eighties we know now that the new decade will bring about important changes. Each of them--including those which apparently are only of regional significance--will have effects beyond the decade. On each individual issue we must, by means of a clear position, make our contribution in order to insure a development which will guarantee peace and a decent human existence for the world.

We are making energetic efforts toward the continuation of integration policy in Europe against a disintegration into a mere customs union.

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We stress the awareness of our joint values and the identical security interests of Europe and America as well as the determination to act according to this realization, against fashionable anti-Americanism and European separation.

We emphasize balance as the absolutely necessary prerequisite for stability and security against the predominance of the East with the danger of instability, and, in the end, unavoidable adaptation or subjugation.

We want to emphasize the effort to achieve balance on the lowest possible level of armaments against the danger of a new arms race.

We want cooperation between East and West, the continuation of the detente policy on the basis of an action-ready alliance against a new cold war with its dangers to understanding and stability and with its dangers to the interests of the German nation which lives in two separate states.

We want a Europe which will be the point of departure for peaceful conflict resolution all over the world, against shifting the East-West conflict to the Third World, which would bring the export of tensions rather than peaceful solutions.

We want to support the independence of the countries of the Third World against the policy of spheres of influence and predominance which would turn the Third World into a point of departure for worldwide tensions.

We advocate the concept of West-East-South cooperation in energy policy against the danger of a worldwide energy distribution battle.

We stress our determination to overcome the North-South conflict on the basis of moral responsibility and responsibility for world peace, against the neglect or economic domination of the Third World with the attendant denial or moral and political responsibility.

We stress our determination, through dialogue and negotiation, to create a pluralist and peaceful worldwide system, aimed at equality and partnership, against independent action or opposing action, against the preservation of traditional superiority structures and against the creation of new structures of domination of one by the other.

Ladies and Gentlemen, West Germany's foreign policy must, on all of these issues, come up with a clear definition of its objectives, it must be steadfast in the pursuit of these objectives, and it must be calculable in terms of its intentions. We will be able to pursue our road clearly only if we always keep in mind that freedom and human rights, self-determination and the preservation of peace are the unalterable characteristics of German policy.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

POLL REVEALS FEELING ON DEFENSE, DETERRENCE, WAR

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 31 May 80 p 93

[Text] The French people perceive clearly the seriousness of the international situation. A very large percentage of them feel their country is directly or indirectly affected. They are in agreement to maintain or intensify the nation's military effort, especially the nuclear one. These are the principal findings of the L'EXPRESS-Bernard Krief poll.

Among 72 percent of the persons canvassed, the impression prevails ("totally agree" and "inclined to agree") that we are advancing "towards a new war." Hence the importance of the open debate in France today on defense.

What kind of war do Frenchmen expect? Obviously, nuclear war: 25 percent of them placed it at the top of the list. But--it is instructive to note--27 percent of them placed it at the bottom of the list, indicating refusal to contemplate the cataclysm. This figure is boosted by the 9 percent of Frenchmen who refused to respond to this question. Apprehensions and reactions, however, were shaded according to political persuasion.

The RPR [Rally for the Republic] constituency was the most "typed." Do the current threats to world peace affect France? "Yes" was the response of 42 percent of the Gaullists (24 percent for the UDF [French Democratic Union], 25 percent for the PCF [French Communist Party], 23 percent for the PS [Socialist Party]). Are nuclear weapons indispensable ("totally agree" or "inclined to agree")? Responses were 89 percent in the affirmative. Solid faith in the Strike Force. Identical anxiety to reinforce defenses, particularly atomic.

The UDF registered the same anxieties, though less acute. The Giscardians felt France is "affected" by the threats of war, but mostly "indirectly" (66 percent). And, while those who favor a greater defense effort represent a substantial percentage of the party membership (33 percent), it is somewhat less than the corresponding percentage in the RPR (37 percent).

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Among the communists, 70 percent felt concerned over the war threat, although 14 percent among them felt that France is not affected by it. Only 51 percent of them considered the nuclear effort indispensable, and 45 percent felt that weapons expenditures should be reduced.

As regards the PS constituency, while they are the least numerous (67 percent nonetheless) of those who expect a war, 69 percent of them feel ("totally agree" or "inclined to agree") that nuclear weapons are indispensable. Only 56 percent of them considered our nuclear arsenal currently credible, but only 15 percent were in favor of strengthening it.

Poll 5-16 May 1980 Using Sampling of 1000 Persons Representative of French Population 18 Years of Age and Over

A New War

Seeing what is happening in the world, the impression is that it is proceeding toward a new war.

Totally agree	32 percent	} 72 percent
Inclined to agree	40 "	
Inclined to disagree		17 "
Totally disagree		6 "
No opinion		5 "

France Affected

Do the threats to world peace affect France?

Affect it directly	28 percent	} 85 percent
Affect it indirectly	57 "	
Do not affect it		12 "
No opinion		3 "

What Kind of Conflict

If France were to some day become involved in a war, what, in your opinion would be the kind of conflict for which our Armed Forces should mainly be prepared?

First priority:

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World war with atomic weapons	25 percent
Hit-and-run operations (commando type) beyond our borders	20 "
World war with conventional weapons	17 "
War of resistance after invasion of our territory by a foreign power	16 "
Long war with conventional weapons beyond our borders	7
Civil war	5
Other	1
Refused to respond	9

Nuclear Weapons Indispensable

Nuclear weapons are indispensable to the defense of France.

Totally agree	34 percent	}	64 percent
Inclined to agree	30 "		
Inclined to disagree			11 "
Totally disagree			20 "
No opinion			5 "

Deterrence

Can the French Strike Force deter a potential aggressor from attacking us?

Definitely yes	23 percent
Perhaps yes	39 "
Probably not	19 "
Definitely not	13 "
No opinion	6 "

National Defense Outlay

Should France today spend more or less than it has until now on its military defense?

More	23 percent	}	65 percent
The same amount	42 "		
Less			27 "
No opinion			8 "

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Weapons

Should France rather increase its arsenal of conventional weapons, or rather increase its arsenal of atomic weapons (missiles, submarines, etc)?

Rather increase its atomic weapons	33 percent	
Rather increase its conventional weapons	27	"
Neither one nor the other	32	"
No opinion	8	"

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

UDF PRESIDENT LECANUET INTERVIEWED

Paris PARIS MATCH in French 6 Jun 80 p 91

[Interview with Jean Lecanuet, president of UDF [French Democratic Union] by Florence Portes; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] [Question] You do not seem very satisfied with Giscard's foreign policy. That is unusual.

[Answer] That is not exactly correct. I approve of the Giscard-Brezhnev meeting, which conveyed to the Soviets the serious effects their behavior is having on peace. It was a solemn warning to the USSR, in that, to the extent we have been informed on that meeting, the dialog was straightforward. In my opinion, however, maintaining a dialog is not itself sufficient. I feel the Soviets have as their sole objective their expansion worldwide. Talk is not going to stop them. They will be stopped only by a show of force equal and opposite to theirs. Marxists measure everything only in terms of forces. Remember Stalin's words: "The Pope? How many divisions does he have?" This is why we, the French, as well as our European partners, must develop our forces economically, monetarily and militarily. And I insist on the idea that France must restore order in its relations with its EEC partners, after which the EEC must redefine its relations with the United States. Europe can no longer be the vassal of the United States, but rather the partner in an alliance based on two supporting columns. She must be a strong Europe with her own power and her own privileged relations with Africa and the Third World, to be able to pursue, in the interest of peace, her own dialog with the USSR.

[Question] Edmund Muskie, the American secretary of state, was rather hard on Giscard...

[Answer] He is in a poor position to lecture others. United States policy has undergone endless changes that have thrown the West into a state of uncertainty. Furthermore, the United States does not hesitate to come to terms with the USSR when they are in its own interest. Half of Europe is still bearing the burden of the division of the world after Yalta. The

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Americans messed up things for everyone but themselves when they disrupted the international monetary system without contributing to the institution of one to replace it. Their behavior in the Iranian affair has been very trivial. That having been said, I hope they will recover a semblance of power.

[Question] Do you approve the government's silence on the matter of the Olympics?

[Answer] The cards today are stacked. These are no longer the Games. And if we go there we give the impression of condoning the USSR. The French government cannot behave like an Eastern European dictator and forbid its athletes to go there. In my opinion, however, it should express a view, a recommendation. My own is: Do not go to Moscow.

[Question] What do you think of the Peyrefitte draft law on freedom and security?

[Answer] I think its intent is good. But it is absolutely necessary to maintain the equality of all with respect to the penalty and sentencing according to the needs of the offender. Therefore, I think the government must neither become set on its own draft nor resort to a blocked vote or any form of constraint on the members of Parliament. This must be a concerted law.

[Question] The UDF has remained singularly silent in the Poniowski affair. Why?

[Answer] Michel Poniowski needs no support from others. He is managing very well on his own. To date, his cause has been very good. But if he should ask for my support I would gladly give it to him.

[Question] Are you satisfied with the current political climate?

[Answer] I find it slightly better than it has been. Every day brings new evidence of the left's incoherence and of its unfitness to govern the country. And since I have always maintained that the unity of the left is mere fiction, I find this situation spiritually bracing. Furthermore, the RPR [Rally for the Republic] is no longer creating that impassioned climate of the time of Chirac's candidacy for the European elections, and I am happy about this. As for the attacks against certain members of the government, they are entirely trumped-up.

[Question] But nevertheless, this unpredictable manner of governing, information that never gets out...

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[Answer] Oh, but that is the 5th Republic! Perhaps the "presidentialization" of government has gone a bit far. Dating back to the first referendum, however, I denounced this lack of institutions. The French wanted it this way. They got it. On the other hand, there are some advantages to a highly personalized government, the foremost of which is its stability. The essential thing is that, in a troubled world in the throes of crises, Giscard, up to now at least, has been able to keep us out of chaos.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

ESTEREL SHIPYARD STILL MAKING WOODEN WARSHIPS

Madrid DEFENSA in Spanish May 80 pp 6,7,9

[Article by Artabro: "'Esterel's Wooden Cutters"]

[Text] At an initial and superficial glance it may seem that a wooden combat vessel is synonymous with improvisation, stinginess, and technological backwardness. The "Chantiers Navals de l'Esterel" [Esterel Shipyard] of Cannes, with movie festival fame, with more than 160 craft built for some 20 governments, has taken it upon itself to prove to us the opposite.

With advice from the French navy and the Bureau Veritas [Veritas Survey Office], classifier and insurer, the mahogany hulls are built with laminated ends and triple-lined slats interlaced on the entire surface without calking. Their advantages over steel or aluminum stem from their lightness, solidity, resistance, lesser vulnerability to the impacts of small-caliber weapons, much greater longevity, easy maintenance and lack of vibration, with better thermal and acoustical insulation.

On all these scores, and on various others, the l'Esterel shipyard is capable of producing the best references regarding the endurance of the wooden hulls with such construction now being used in countries with difficult climates such as Venezuela, Gabon, Indonesia, Tunisia, or Mauritania, or assigned to the French customs service and the French merchant marine.

Standardized Designs

At the present time the shipbuilding of the Chantiers Naval de l'Esterel focuses on some of its own designs:

1. Craft 42 meters in length (Type 42) for use either as rapid attack boats (with speeds of 36.5 or 38.5 knots depending on the type of engine used), equipped with antinaval missiles and guns to which are added advanced detection and firing guidance equipment or for use as rapid patrol boats (with speeds of 30 to 40 knots).
2. Craft of 32.1 and 37.2 meters in length (Types 32 and 37, according to the builder's designation) for rapid patrol with maximum speeds of between 30 and 35 knots.

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3. Craft of 21, 26.8, and 28 meters with maximum speeds of between 25 and 35 knots for coastal patrol.

A summary of the craft's characteristics can be gleaned from the data presented in the annexed table.

The most important of the designs, Type 42, comes in two very different versions--the 42M which, as an attack craft, includes the above-mentioned armament while Type 42--the patrol craft version--does not exceed 150 tons when fully loaded with less power and speed even though its range seems to be increased to 1,500 nautical miles. Its crew is reduced to 23 men and its armament listed as two or three 40-70-mm [millimeter] guns, two 20-mm heavy machineguns, and perhaps four to eight SS 12M wire-guided missiles. In view of its less combat-related missions than those of the 42M, this design places the bridge at a lower level than that of the former.

More recently a new design made its appearance--model 42H--a kind of 42M in which the sternmost space earmarked for the installation of antinaval missiles is devoted to the operation and service of a helicopter whose function is to pinpoint targets and guide antinaval missiles beyond the normal radar horizon in craft of this size. With a displacement of 165 tons when fully loaded, the 42H design is integrated completely with Type 42M on the overall plan called Shadblow.

Shadblow

Focused on surface action the Shadblow plan is nevertheless inspired by the "hunter killing groupments" conceived during the SGM to meet the submarine threat by means of groupings of surface vessels.

Developed jointly by the Chantiers Navals de l'Esterel, the MATRA [General Mechanical Aeronautics Company, Propulsion Section--France] weapons system builder, and the CSEE [Signals and Electrical Enterprise Company--France] for optical rangefinders, the Shadblow plan tries to meet the needs of the situation in both peace and war or times of crisis facing, on one hand, the growing threat represented by vessels with antinaval missiles and on the other for patrol functions in connection with the protection of the 200-mile economic zone. The plan is premised on simplicity and maximum cost-effectiveness.

Within these variables the Shadblow plan uses light (patrol) craft with two specialties--missile-launching and patrol--the latter equipped with a helicopter. Obviously both models correspond--this was deliberately planned--to the 42M and 42H designs since they are described in the blueprints of the l'Esterel shipyard in Cannes even though the theoretical plan can be carried out by other craft in similar service.

In the development of the plan what is involved is to have a missile of great capability to neutralize the enemy's missile-launching craft beyond the radar horizon without risking one's own equipment. For that purpose it

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is important to locate the hostile craft with sufficient accuracy and to communicate its coordinates to the missile-launching craft. With this in mind the helicopter on board is used, so that two types of units already mentioned are involved: the hunter patrol craft if we can use the cynegetic term, and the missile-launching patrol boats. In this specialization the manufacturers and designers consider the hunter model as having an important use in peacetime in view of its patrolling capability over a great distance, all of this within frankly low construction and maintenance costs if these are compared with those that are necessary for other craft of similar missions.

Specifications for each of the two specialized types are as follows:

1. Missile-launching craft: Capability to carry four to six antinaval missiles, accurate localization by the helicopter or the craft, transmission of information on the target supplied by one of these, and computation on the basis of said data.
2. Hunter craft: Exploration of the area, putting the helicopter into action with its capability of localizing the target or the helicopter in question, transmission of its data to the missile-launching craft.

For both types of craft minimal self-defense is necessary (light guns with their firing guidance) while the helicopter on board will include a control radar, a data transponder, and a radar reflector.

The aggregate system seeks maximum economy of means with minimum maintenance and maximum availability still, I shall repeat this once more, within the parameters of low cost.

The makeup of the Shadblow groupings recommended by their own designers would consist of a twosome hunter-killer craft for wartime which would be converted into a threesome (with the addition of a second hunter craft) for the carrying out of missions proper to peacetime or crisis in the sense, in case of the latter, that any patrol boat should be able to accomplish its mission independently, with the grouping operating over an extensive area. It is even suggested that the operation in peacetime be carried out from different craft (hunter patrol boats at the service of the coast guard, the Ministry of Transport or the Treasury, and missile-launching patrol boats for the navy), total operations being effected by means of combined forces.

In wartime the operations would be carried out on the basis of the sweeping of a danger zone by the hunter craft with the use of helicopters as the need arose. Following the detection of hostile targets and their chase, with pertinent data transmitted to the missile-launching craft, the consequent computation would be made and, in the last resort, the weapons fired. The evolution of such a procedure could be very brief.

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Even though the Shadblow plan is originally based on the use of small patrol boats with limits in the operations of light helicopters, for clearly economic reasons there is always the possibility of increasing both availability and service through the use of land-based helicopters or those carried by warships or thanks to naval patrol aircraft as long as they are equipped with adequate data-transmission systems.

Conclusions

All the craft built by the Chantiers Naval de l'Esterel seem to seek obsessively a balance between maximum effectiveness and prudent cost, focusing very specially on the emphasis and development of the most adequate and lasting characteristics of naval craft built in wood. In search of the optimal compromise among forms of cutting hulls and hydrofoils with slim prow designs and sufficient beam sternmost, good transversal stability is achieved with high speeds and notable resistance to rough seas.

The weapons systems to be installed can range from some sophisticated features that are not too expensive in the large craft (Shadblow plan and its approximations) to the most simple ones in smaller units slated for patrol work in peacetime.

In short, there is a search for a high cost-effectiveness ratio.

	Type 42 (combat version)	Type 37	Type 32	Type 27	Type 21
Length (meters)	42	37.2	32.1	26.8	21
Beam (meters)	7.8	6.6	5.75	5.0	4.7
Displacement when fully loaded (tons)	190	105	80-90	47	30
Diesel power plant: Engines and shafts	3	2	2	2	2
Total power (in horsepower)	10,800 to 12,000	5,000 to 5,500	2,860 to 5,500	960 to 1,800	1,200 to 2,130
Speed with maximum power (in knots)	38.5	33	35	30	35
Range [in nautical miles]	1,000	1,500	1,500	750	450
Crew	25				8

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	<u>Type 42</u>	<u>Type 37</u>	<u>Type 32</u>	<u>Type 27</u>	<u>Type 21</u>
Armament	1 40-mm or 57-mm gun, 1 30-mm or 40-mm gun, 4-6 antinaval missiles	2 40-mm guns, 4 SS-12M missiles	1 20-mm and 1 40-mm gun, 4 SS-12M missiles	1 20-mm gun	1 12.7-mm machinegun

PHOTO CAPTIONS

1. p 6. Rapid 28-meter long patrol boats sold to Guinea (Conakry)
2. p 7 (top). The patrol boat "President El-Hadj Omar Bongo" of the Gabonese navy.
3. p 7 (middle). Rapid 45-ton cutter used by the French customs service.
4. p 7 (bottom). In the foreground the photo shows the building of a French cutter. Behind it, a 22-meter long patrol boat.
5. p 7 (top, right). Flags of countries using l'Esterel wooden craft.
6. p 9. General view of the Chantier Navals de l'Esterel [Cannes, France].

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FRANCE

BRIEFS

COMMUNIST DEFENSE STUDY--A PCF "white book" on French military problems is being considered at the Place du Colonel-Fabien [PCF headquarters]. The party's federal secretaries, who met recently in Montreuil, have decided to initiate a series of studies of these problems prior to the presidential election. The national defense committee, chaired by former Paris deputy Louis Baillot; is in charge of organizing discussions with the [PCF] militants through the local party cells. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 14 Jul 80 p 11]

CIVIL DEFENSE GUIDE--A detailed guide on how to protect oneself from radioactive fallout in case of a nuclear explosion will be distributed to every French household. It will indicate the precautions to be taken to survive 15 days under shelter, and the location of the shelter assigned to each. This civil defense guide will be available upon completion of the 4-year program designed to systematically survey the possible shelters in each department. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 2 Jun 80 p 14] 9399

SCIENCE SECRETARY--Robert Chabbal, former general manager of CNRS [National Center for Scientific Research], is soon to be appointed deputy secretary general of NATO, in charge of scientific matters. A professor of physics at d'Orsay University, Chabbal has made no secret of his leftist sympathies. In this new post, he will be responsible in particular for awarding research scholarships to American scientific universities. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 23 Jun 80 p 19] 8946

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

PCE DISSIDENT SEMPRUN REFLECTS ON DEMISE OF EUROCOMMUNISM

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 1 Jun 80 pp 49, 51, 52

[Interview with Jorge Semprun, PCE dissident, by Miguel Ramos, CAMBIO 16 correspondent in Paris, date not given]

[Text] A new version that will correct some facts in the book which won the Planet Prize and which will be based more on the intensity of the experiences of clandestinity, on profiles of his party companions, on political reflection concerning the timeliness of Eurocommunism, and the split and transition in the PCE [Spanish Communist Party]. That is what Jorge Semprun talked about with our correspondent in Paris, Miguel Ramos.

[Question] Why are you writing a second part to "Autobiografia de Federico Sanchez" [Autobiography of Federico Sanchez]?

[Answer] The second part of "Federico Sanchez," even though I don't think that that is what it should be called because it is not structured as a sequel, will deal a little with the same themes and events from a different viewpoint and also in a different form. I believe that there are many other things still to be said and the publication itself of the "Autobiografia" has triggered correspondence and reactions from a whole series of persons who, with their recollections, anecdotes, and records, have rekindled my own memory and have enabled me to correct things, to probe more deeply into others, and to add new reflections.

[Question] What will be corrected and what will be new?

[Answer] Well then, correction in the sense of a concrete information is out of question because there were practically no errors [in the first book]. More than anything the new material will be in the nature of details as, for example, the fact that Manuel Azcarate was not at one of the meetings in Moscow which I mentioned whereas I said in the book that "I believe I remember."

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The corrections will not, then, go further, among other reasons because I am still waiting for proof that that book is unfounded, libelous, that it contains a stack of slanders and inventions as some have alleged.

On the other hand the second book will be much more personal and literary, more historic and less controversial in an effort to reconstruct theoretically some of the problems that appeared with the publication of my book. The new book is already organized and is in rough draft form even though I have to rewrite some chapters and touch up others. What I have to do is to give it a literary mold, which calls for peace and quiet.

[Question] To which aspects not handled in the initial version do you wish now to call attention?

[Answer] My personal relation with the history of the PCE is complex and in some case ambiguous. There is a period which I know from inside, first as an activist and then as a leader from 1954 to 1964. With that part of events I have direct involvement and more or less complete familiarity. But there is a very complex phenomenon which is common to all communist parties and it is that people know current history which they witness but very little of the past, and in the Spanish Communist Party more concretely than elsewhere people know practically nothing. First, because of the objective conditions of clandestinity and the struggle against Francoism, which mandated that one not speak of the past, and secondly because of the history of the civil war itself and subsequently of the guerrilla from 1945 to 1948 when, because of Stalin's advice, the armed struggle was halted.

In that period of the party's history there are things about which nothing was said and I would like to solve a conflict with my very self in the sense that when a group of leaders, I among them, were expelled from the PCE for having struggled in connection with a series of issues, we did not broach the very questions of the party's past, we did not wonder whether it was possible to completely de-Stalinize the concept of the Marxist world without de-Stalinizing the PCE.

In that group there is a series of individuals who were exiled in the rest of Western Europe, in Latin America, or in the Soviet Union and who were slandered and some who were even assassinated on orders of the then leadership group still without knowing who made the decision nor what was the specific charge. About some of those cases I have received news following the publication of my "Autobiografia," news which is not simple impressions or unchecked recollections but rather documents of individuals who did not know what to do with them or perhaps did not dare to use them for fear of harming the party.

[Question] Do these documents belong to former communist activists who are anti-Carrillo today?

[Answer] No, they are people who have been communist activists all their lives and who at a given time have stopped militating or no longer hold

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positions but who have not changed their fundamental opinion in the sense that they have not become enemies of the PCE. And the proof is that they have kept these documents. But today the situation has changed and there have to come to light issues such as why Monzon and Comorera were eliminated, why Quinones who was later shot by the Franco regime was slandered, why Gabriel Trilla was stabbed in Madrid, and so on. All those things can be analyzed historically today without the dread that Francoism will use it as an anti-communist argument. It is as if we were to decide today not to speak of Joseph Stalin's crimes because that could harm the world idea of communism.

There is, then, a very serious problem typified by Eurocommunism and which is always avoided by the present PCE and that problem is the relationship with the type of society that exists in Russia and the communist strategy in Western Europe.

I believe that in the PCE there is a series of fundamental things which have not changed and which are the other obstacle, the other hindrance to Eurocommunism in the sense that, on one hand one does not get to the bottom of a concrete and Marxist (in quotation marks) analysis of the class structure and the nature of the Soviet regime which has nothing socialist about it and which is another type of oppressive system of domination and world expansionism. On the other hand one observes the internal functioning of the PCE where centralism predominates over internal democracy making it a party cut to the pattern, if one wishes to avoid saying Stalinist, of the Third International with everything that this means in terms of monopoly and thinking and theoretical elaboration in the hands of very few individuals who are furthermore very old.

Thus, Santiago Carrillo has had the great skill to fragment the political power of the PCE into very broad, unmanageable organs which cannot meet and cannot discuss in order later to concentrate power in the hands of permanent committees and secretariats formed by men of the old pro-Carrillo guard who are those who in fact make the decisions.

[Question] And is that lack of internal democracy in the PCE to which you refer a consequence of the historical structure of the party itself or is it motivated by the men who head it today?

[Answer] I believe that the two things are combined. Many individuals are frightened, for example, by the fact that the Italian Communist Party is so different, more liberal, more daring, but I believe contrariwise that the Italian Communist Party functions like all the others, with the single major difference that it is headed by intellectuals who are highly cultured and involved with problems of information while the communist parties of France and Spain are headed by bureaucratic officials of extremely remote worker origin who have not touched tools for decades.

[Question] Why does the PCE not go to the heart of the matter when it comes to Eurocommunism?

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[Answer] Eurocommunism, which is a much less recent and original thing than its promoters allege and which has roots going back to the 1920's, has continued to be an idea and as far as I am concerned it is dead, especially after the failure of the unity of the left in France because of and thanks to the French Communist Party and its closeness to Moscow. The thing is that it is not possible to elaborate a democratic and pluralistic way for socialism which rearranges, criticizes, and redraws the basic concepts of Leninism without breaking theoretically and practically with the country whose model of society is exactly the opposite of what it is proposing today. One cannot be credible or mobilize the masses with a plan difficult in itself and already approved by social democracy. How would we be different then? So far we have distinguished ourselves because we were the more or less charismatic representatives of the victorious revolution in Russia which was creating a new society, but now it turns out to be that this is untrue. Where does the identity of communists reside, then?

This is where Eurocommunism reaches its limit when it accepts the idea of relinquishing power once it has achieved it if elections, something unthinkable in the theory of Leninism because it should later lose power achieved at the polls is never lost. It is not possible to develop Eurocommunism saying that Russian socialism is not made up of an aggregate, that it is a little primitive, when it is exactly the opposite of socialism.

[Question] Has the political realm of communism then been occupied by a PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party]-type socialism?

[Answer] I was not thinking of Spain specifically. That field of democratic socialism is the one where the split of the socialist movement occurred in the 1920's in the countries of Western Europe when the communist parties were created in opposition to that democratic socialism and following the Russian model. In some aspects the PCE today stands to the right of the PSOE and in others to the left, but it is the latter which occupies the place in which the PCE seeks to grow.

On the other hand the field of Eurocommunism, when all its points are elaborated, is the one which historically occupies, European socialism whether for good or evil. It is the field of the parliamentary struggle, of elections, of pluralism, of conceding the place of an opposition and adverse opinions, the alternation of parties, of maintaining the idea of pluralism even after the peaceful seizure of power through elections. It is true for example that Santiago Carrillo said that social democrats have never transformed society when they have been in power, but it is also true that the communists have not done it either. They have changed society because when they have held power they have established a society of oppression and in Europe they have still not boasted of it.

[Question] Is the confrontation of Enrico Berlinguer and Santiago Carrillo with Moscow merely an electoral gimmick as far as you are concerned?

[Answer] One cannot say that it is a confrontation merely to achieve gains, merely as a tactical move. It is obvious that there is a tendency that has

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been converted almost spontaneously starting from a point where some Soviet features are criticized, especially from the time of the occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968. But history shows that that criticism reaches a certain level and then regresses and some aspects of Soviet foreign policy are approved but not others.

Anyway, I don't believe that the instrument of a workers' political party is the one to centralize all struggles and direct them. Today society is much more complex and there is a whole series of social movements such as those of ecologists, youths, professionals, university people, neighbors, women's groups, and so on which the parties cannot direct or use, groups which escape their control.

We are in a situation where the model of a bourgeois, radical political party, inherited by the Bolsheviks and harshly perfected during the Stalinist era as a power apparatus, does not serve for anything else but to keep power in the party itself. And that adjustment proves more difficult even to the communist and to the Socialist parties in which there is diversity of opinions and currents. Only the long existence of the communist parties justifies their perseverance in existing, independently of their possibility of attaining power and transforming society.

[Question] Finally, in what context does the conference of European communist parties held a few days ago in Paris fall and how do you interpret the Spanish absence from that conference?

[Answer] I don't understand fully the reasons why the Soviet party insisted on holding that conference. The Russians have a mania, an obsession for communist meetings which in some way enhance their policy, but on this occasion they called for the conference under the worst possible conditions. There have been few repercussions and furthermore the absence of some essential parties of Western Europe, such as the Italian, Spanish, Yugoslav, and Romanian parties, has been noteworthy.

Furthermore, while the speech of Boris Ponomarev* was very dogmatic in the sense that it provided no third alternative--one was either with Moscow or sided with the NATO powers--the final document was broad and flexible in appearance.

[Question] Is it true that the Soviet Union's position is so difficult, is it true that the American plan to rearm Europe worries Moscow so much following the invasion of Afghanistan?

[Answer] It is obvious however that this approach will not solve the problem which Moscow has with the Eurocommunists. I believe that it would have been a mistake for the PCE to come to Paris because it would have meant the end of any possible autonomous elaboration of the policy of the communist parties.

*[Candidate-member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and member of its Secretariat]

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The position of Georges Marchais is explained by the internal situation of French politics given that the unity of the left favored the Socialists and had it come to power the French Communist Party would have played second fiddle. The French communists deliberately decided not to accede to power in order not to modify their concept of the absolute hegemonic role of the communist party, its role as a different party. It is the stance of the communist leadership group which is the most retrograde and sectarian among all those existing in Europe.

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SPAIN

BRIEFS

ANTI-TERRORIST COOPERATION--As part of a wide-ranging international cooperation program aimed at keeping track of terrorist activities, Spanish police will be able to question terrorists in other countries who have been or are implicated in terrorist activities in Spain. This cooperation already exists with at least two European countries. [Text] [Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 13 Jul 80 p 5]

NAVAL MODERNIZATION PROGRAM--The Ministry of Defense will spend 968 billion pesetas during the next 10 years to adapt the navy to modern times. The naval program foresees the completion of the first combat group comprised of an aircraft carrier, a cruiser, 4 frigates, 4 light transport ships, 2 minesweepers, a tanker, and 20 combat, transportation and maritime patrol airplanes. [Text] [Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 1 Jun 80 p 5]

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COUNTRY SECTION

SWEDEN

CENTER PARTY'S FATE DEPENDS ON FALLDIN'S ECONOMY MOVES

Stockholm VECKANS AFFARER in Swedish 12 Jun 80 p 25

[Article by Ake Landquist: "Standard of Living and Economic Restraint Decide the Center Party's Chances in the Eighties"]

[Text] The future of the Center Party literally lies in the hands of Thorbjorn Falldin. The deciding factor will be how the prime minister will handle the strict savings program planned for state spending. To be sure, the Center Party is now free from the "nuclear power trap." However, the party--with its parliamentary meeting starting this week--has new issues to deal with. Perhaps one issue will be the standard of living.

The Center Party's greatest strength today is that the party's "soul" is intact. That may, however, be the party's only strength.

The first time Thorbjorn Falldin, the leader of the Center Party, spoke of the "soul" of the party, was when the three-party coalition government collapsed in the fall of 1978.

"In a coalition government all parties must be prepared for concession. It must, however, never go as far as one party demanding that another party give up its soul," said Falldin during a press conference at the Parliament Building, Friday 5 October 1978.

The nuclear power issue, Falldin's conscience issue, overthrew the first coalition government. The nuclear power issue has been a heavy and a trying burden for the party. Falldin's handling of the issue has led to the fact that the Center Party has been labeled a single issue party. The sounds from the other strings of the party's lyre are drowned in the roar from the nuclear power.

Everything seems to have been put into the nuclear power issue. The reason is the "dead-lock formulation" says a leading member of the Center Party to VECKANS AFFARER and this, of course, refers to Falldin's categorical statement about his conscience and the nuclear power.

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Vitamin Shot

Thorbjorn Falldin succeeded Gunnar Hedlund in the summer of 1971. This event acted as a vitamin shot for the party's public opinion. One year later the Center Party had the support of 29 percent of the voters on SIFO's [the Swedish Institute for Public Opinion Polls] voters' barometer. The party has since dropped from this record level down to the bottom figure of 15.5 percent in May.

The Center Party launched its anti-nuclear power campaign in 1973. Since then the trend has been a drop in the public opinion poll figures for the party. This drop is attributed to the nuclear power issue.

The referendum indicated that the nuclear power issue could be eliminated as a highly controversial issue. The Center Party was at last "free of the atoms." That should have been a good basis for a favorable comeback in the public opinion polls. The drop in the public opinion polls figures, however, has continued even after the referendum.

During the election the Center Party lost voters to the right. "They fell for the promises of tax reductions proposed by the Moderates and perhaps also for Gosta Bohman's luminosity. But this loss is a short-term one," says a Center Party cabinet minister.

That seems to be a correct interpretation. According to SIFO's opinion analysis, the members of the Center Party who voted for the Moderates have started to flock back to the party. At the same time, however, the Center Party has begun to lose followers to the left, that is to the Social Democrats. The conflict on the job market functioned as a catalyst in this process. The result was lower figures despite the return of followers from the right.

This indicates that it is difficult for the Center Party to make a comeback. The party has no new issues to offer. The Center Party convention that began this week did not result in anything new. The revision of the Center Party's platform did not bring forth any great new changes either. The new platform was to have been adopted in January of this year, but the referendum prevented that. Therefore, the earliest that this newly revised platform can be adopted is during a special meeting of the Center Party in February or March next year.

The issues that will characterize the Center Party's platform until the elections in 1982 are the "old" Center Party issues about decentralization, environment and management of the national economy; that is, the issues that represent the Center Party's nucleus or "soul."

Standard of Living

The stress researcher, Lennart Levi, will talk about environment and social policy in regard to standard of living, at the Center Party's convention in

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Solleftea. Perhaps the standard of living can become the new issue for the Center Party in the eighties. It goes together with both the Center Party's issues and the desperate federal financial situation.

The Center Party's decline has been disguised to a high degree by the fact that the party holds the seat of the prime minister. To be sure, the Center Party has lost both the election and the referendum, but nonetheless the prime minister is a member of the Center Party. As a result, the future of the Center Party depends in a high degree on how the administration fares; especially how the administration handles the economic policy regarding the savings plan which is an essential and politically sensitive issue.

The future of the Center Party lies, therefore, literally in the hands of Thorbjorn Falldin. He must be able to hold the government together while dealing with the savings plan.

Falldin's Confidants

The toughness Falldin displays can be the deciding factor, not only for the coalition government, but also for the party's future. Therefore it is important whom he chooses as his advisers and whom he confers with before making important decisions.

Since the election success in 1976, Falldin has lost three staunch supporters. Vice chairman Johannes Antonsson has resigned and has been replaced by Karin Soder. The under secretary of State for Federal Emergency and Strategy, Gosta Gunnarsson, has resigned and has been replaced by Goran Johansson. The party secretary, Gustaf Jonnergard, has been replaced by Allan Petterson.

Thorbjorn Falldin tests his ideas and discusses his decisions with four important but different groups:

- a) The Under secretary of State Goran Johansson who has supported Falldin for many years, along with the party presiding committee members, Karin Soder and Olof Johansson. He continually discusses daily issues with those people.
- b) The cabinet members; that is to say all seven Center Party ministers, along with the chairman of the parliamentary party, Claes Elmstedt; Goran Johansson; party secretary Allan Petterson along with information chief Rolf Orjes. This group has lunch together every Tuesday at the Teaterkafe--next door to the Parliament building--and discusses urgent political issues.
- c) The "old buddies" from the SLU-time [Swedish Rural Youth Association] Anders Dahlgren, Nils Asling and Karl Boo. He usually confers with this group about both political issues and "conscience issues."
- d) People "around home"; that is people in the neighborhood around Ramvik where Thorbjorn Falldin grew up, who act as a sounding board for what "ordinary people" think. The people who dare be honest: These people are from the Center Party and from other parties, as well as non-party affiliated. Sven Erik Nordin, a member of parliament (Center Party), and district representative Harold Ohlsson also belong to this group.

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COUNTRY SECTION

SWEDEN

POLL SHOWS SWEDES READY TO ACCEPT BELT-TIGHTENING LAWS

Stockholm VECKANS AFFARER in Swedish 12 Jun 80 p 3

[Article: "Current Events: The Administration Embarrassed"]


[Text] While the administration is devoting its time to internal bickering and tactical tricks in order to avoid, as much as possible, their own political party losses in connection with the measures which finally must be taken, the voters are now urging the administration to take the bull by the horns and do something.

The quick survey SIFO [Swedish Institute for Public Opinion Polls] conducted for VECKANS AFFARER (see news section) shows that the voters by and large are aware of the crises; they are prepared to make sacrifices in order to cope with the economy.

The research confirms unequivocally that the voters think that the administration is acting slowly. That, in all likelihood, must cause a great embarrassment in the government offices. Hopefully this will lead to the administration getting at last organized and taking the necessary measures immediately.

[VA/SIFO Poll]

- Key: 1) Question: Do you think the time is right for economic restraint; or should we postpone that decision for the future?
 2) The time is right
 3) Postpone for the future
 4) Undecided



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"Hårdare tag mot bostadsbidrag" (a)			
Fråga: "Man har diskuterat olika sätt att skära ned statens utgifter och jag ska nu nämna flera olika. Skulle ni för vart och ett vilja säga om ni anser att det bör genomföras eller inte genomföras?" (b)			
Sparingsområde: (c)	(d)	För: (e)	Emot: (f)
1. Hårdare regler för kommunalt bostadsbidrag	81 %	10 %	8 %
2. En till tre karansdagar vid sjukdom innan sjukersättning betalas ut	72 %	21 %	7 %
3. Nedskärning av försvarskostnaderna	59 %	35 %	6 %
4. Minskad ersättning från sjukkassan för medicin för personer som inte är ständigt beroende av sådan	55 %	33 %	12 %
5. Minskad u-hjälp	50 %	41 %	9 %
6. Minskade statliga bidrag till bostäder	48 %	38 %	15 %
7. Minskade anslag till krisdrabbade företag	47 %	33 %	19 %
8. Sänkt barnbidrag till första barnet	38 %	53 %	9 %
9. Minskade anslag till daghemsutbyggnad	34 %	53 %	13 %
10. Minskade subventioner till livsmedel, i första hand kött och fisk	32 %	59 %	10 %
11. Minskade möjligheter till delpension	30 %	56 %	14 %
12. Minskad kompensation för prishöjningar åt pensionärerna	25 %	66 %	9 %
13. Minskade anslag till skolor och undervisning	19 %	71 %	9 %

Key:

- a) "Firmer Measures against Housing Subsidies"
- b) Question: "There has been a discussion of where to cut federal spending. Which categories do you think should or should not be cut?"
- c) Savings category
- d) For
- e) Against
- f) Undecided
- 1) Stricter rules for municipal housing subsidies
- 2) One to three waiting days during illness until sickness benefit is paid out
- 3) Reduction of defense expenditure
- 4) Reduced benefit from the health insurance for medicine people are not dependent upon
- 5) Reduced aid for developing countries
- 6) Reduced government subsidies for housing
- 7) Reduced appropriation for emergency actions
- 8) Lowered allowance for the first child
- 9) Reduced appropriation for day care centers
- 10) Reduced subsidies for food; foremost meat and bacon
- 11) Reduced possibilities for partial pension
- 12) Reduced compensation for price increases to pensioners
- 13) Reduced appropriation for schools and education.

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The majority of the Swedish people agree with the politicians on the urgency of serious economic belt-tightening. Most of the people recommend a reduction of state spending rather than an increase in taxes and fees. This becomes apparent from research conducted by SIFO for VECKANS AFFARER, as a result of the economic savings package announced by the government.

According to this VA/SIFO research, and overwhelming majority recommends stricter rules for municipal housing subsidies, reinstating unpaid waiting days before sick-leave pay begins, and a reduction in defense spending. On the other hand, a clear majority opposes intervention in the educational system and a reduction in the standard for pensioners.

SIFO conducted a quick telephone survey of 310 people, a cross-section of the population, during 2-6 June. SIFO points out that this sample is not quite as reliable as in the regular opinion polls with 1000 interviewers. However, the general tendencies in the responses give certain clear information about the opinion of the people now.

The SIFO research confirms above all that the politicians in the three parties in power--Prime Minister Thorbjorn Falldin (Center Party) leading the way; Minister of Economy Gosta Mundebo (Moderate Coalition Party) and Minister of Budget Ingemar Mundebo (Liberal Party)--have succeeded in making the Swedish people "crisis conscious."

The administration's finance plan prepared this spring had already shown that the state expenditure for the next budget year must be reduced approximately 7 billion kroner--a figure which would have had to be adjusted up to approximately 9 billion kroner after the proposed budget. The administration has been very hesitant in identifying where the economic savings measures would be initiated. In the end of May, however, the Department of Economy's own savings plan leaked out: over 5.5 billion kroner can be saved by cutting down federal spending for social benefits (family allowance, pension subsidies, health insurance, etc.), food subsidies, housing allowance, defense appropriation, aid for the developing countries and education appropriation.

The remainder of the budget increase (1.5-3.5 billion kroner) must therefore come from increased taxes and fees. In the government offices there is talk about an increase in the specific purchase taxes on oil, gasoline, electricity, alcohol and tobacco along with a high capital gains tax.

The VA/SIFO survey shows that such measures have general support among the people. A majority, however, want to protect pensioners and school children from being subjected to these belt-tightening measures. At the same time, many people want a stricter control over "unnecessary" subsidies; that is to those who actually do not "need" it.

The VA/SIFO-survey asked for responses in seven different categories.

The first question was if the time had come for a considerable lowering of the living standard--or could such a decision be postponed for the future.

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An overwhelming majority (83 percent) felt that the time was right--only 8 percent wanted to postpone the belt-tightening measures for the future.

Regarding the choice between increased taxes/fees or reduced federal expenditure (even if it extended to social services), 59 percent wanted to reduce state expenditures and only 10 percent wanted to increase taxes.

On the question of which administration--Socialist or non-Socialist--is more likely to enforce the cut in federal spending, 41 percent picked the Socialist administration and 31 percent the non-Socialist. Twenty two percent felt it made no difference.

The people questioned were asked to state their priorities in reducing federal expenditure in thirteen categories (see graph). The highest priorities were: Stricter rules for municipal housing subsidies (81 percent); three waiting days until sickness benefit is paid out (72 percent); reduction in defense spending (59 percent). The lowest priorities were given to reduced appropriation for price increases to pensioners (25 percent); and reduced possibility for partial pension (30 percent).

The youngest group (under 30) was the most unwilling to limit the right for partial pension (67 percent) and to lower the family allowance for the first child (79 percent). The youngest group was also the most unwilling to initiate waiting days during illness (62 percent), while civil servants were the most in favor (77 percent). A large number of parents with more than one child were prepared to lower the allowance for the first child (44 percent against 49 percent).

During the debate of economic restraint, the automatic compensation for the pensioners has often been discussed, even before the oil price increase. In the VA/SIFO survey the majority of the people interviewed (50 percent against 33 percent) feels it is correct to cut out such compensation.

The people interviewed also had the opportunity to take a position on four different categories where taxes and fees could be increased. A clear majority felt that the income tax (81 percent) and the value-added tax (81 percent) should not be increased. A majority (59 percent) was also against increase in fees for public services, such as child care and medical services.

On the other hand, the majority (65 percent) was in favor of a stiff tax on capital gains with regard to sale of real estate and stock.

When the people interviewed were allowed to suggest other possible income producing means, other possible tax revenues were mentioned: Tax on luxury consumption; on boats; high tax on cars along with a stiff tax on alcohol and tobacco.

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